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供应链渠道协调中的Stackelberg主从对策
引用本文:常良峰,卢震,黄小原. 供应链渠道协调中的Stackelberg主从对策[J]. 控制与决策, 2003, 18(6): 651-655,660
作者姓名:常良峰  卢震  黄小原
作者单位:东北大学,工商管理学院,辽宁,沈阳,110004
基金项目:辽宁省自然科学基金资助项目(9910200208)。
摘    要:针对供应链的渠道协调问题,给出一类供应链Stackelberg主从对策协调机制,其中分销商作为主方给出最小补充期和数量折扣策略,顾客是从方以最优库存策略响应。建立了顾客需求确定下的分销商成本优化模型,同时对比了两种不同数量折扣的协调作用。应用遗传算法对辽化石油分销系统Stackelberg主从对策问题进行离线仿真计算,得出了Stackelberg主从对策均衡解。

关 键 词:供应链 Stackelberg对策 优化 渠道协调 数量折扣 遗传算法
文章编号:1001-0920(2003)06-0651-05

Stackelberg game in supply chain channel coordination
CHANG Liang-feng,LU Zhen,HUANG Xiao-yuan. Stackelberg game in supply chain channel coordination[J]. Control and Decision, 2003, 18(6): 651-655,660
Authors:CHANG Liang-feng  LU Zhen  HUANG Xiao-yuan
Abstract:According to the problem of channel coordination in supply chain, a Stackelberg game coordination mechanism is presented, in which the seller is the leader initializing the minimum replenishment periods and quantity discount policies, and each buyer is the follower responding with the optimal stock policy. The cost optimization model of the seller under each buyer's deterministic demand is established, in which two different quantity discounts are compared. Through the application of genetic algorithm, simulation works are carried out to compute the Stackelberg equilibrium off-line for the problem in Liaoyang petroleum fabric company.
Keywords:Supply chain  Stackelberg game  Optimization  Channel coordination  Quantity discount  Genetic algorithm
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