考虑风险规避与零售商谎报行为的绿色供应链决策研究

为解决二级绿色供应链的产品定价和绿色度决策问题，以零售商具有销售成本信息优势，存在谎报行为为背景，考虑供应链成员具有风险规避特性，通过设计谎报系数，构建集中决策模型与供应商主导Stackelberg博弈模型，分别推导谎报情形下的最优批发价、绿色度和零售价，研究风险规避程度及谎报程度对决策的影响。利用数值仿真验证结论并进行参数敏感性分析。结果表明，集中决策模式下，成员风险规避行为和零售商谎报行为均导致绿色产品批发价和绿色度减小。分散决策模式下，存在零售商风险规避因子拐点，谎报行为对产品最优批发价、绿色度、零售价分别产生正向和负向影响；谎报系数为1.05时，零售商期望利润达到峰值；当谎报系数变动，最优零售价最为敏感，其次为最优绿色度，最后为最优批发价。

A Research on Green Supply Chain Decision-making Considering Risk Avoidance and Retailer's Falsification Behavior

The determination of the product green degree and pricing of the second-level green supply chain is focused on. With the retailer's advantage in sales cost information and the existence of false reporting as the background, the supply chain members' risk aversion characteristics are considered, false reporting coefficients are designed, a centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model are established to get the optimal wholesale price, green degree and retail price in the case of misreporting, and the impact of risk aversion and the degree of misreporting on decision-making is analyzed. The conclusions are verified through a numerical analysis and a parameters sensitivity analysis. The results show that: under centralized decision, the risk aversion of members and the misrepresentation of retailers all lead to a reduction in the wholesale price and greenness of green products. Under decentralized decision, there is an inflection point of the retailer's risk aversion factor and the false reporting behavior has positive and negative effects on the product's optimal wholesale price, greenness, and retail price, respectively;when the false report coefficient is 1.05, the retailer expects profits reach the maximum value; when the false report coefficient changes, the optimal retail price is the most sensitive, followed by the optimal green degree, and finally the optimal wholesale price.