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分散供应链中混合生产的产品质量战略
引用本文:姜沂秀,宋炳良.分散供应链中混合生产的产品质量战略[J].工业工程,2021,24(2):43.
作者姓名:姜沂秀  宋炳良
作者单位:上海海事大学 经济管理学院,上海 201306;南通大学 经济与管理学院,江苏 南通 226001;上海海事大学 经济管理学院,上海 201306
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71771127);南通市社科基金资助项目(2017CNT009)
摘    要:利用Tullock竞赛函数对混合生产的产品质量战略进行讨论。研究表明,混合生产会促进产品质量的提升,在一定条件下,制造商的产品质量甚至会高于单一自制下的产品质量;若外包供应商收取的批发价格足够低,制造商更倾向于混合生产而非单一外包和单一自制;实施混合生产可能会伤害外包供应商;制造商偏好烈性较强的质量竞赛,而外包供应商偏好烈性较弱的质量竞赛。

关 键 词:供应链质量管理  Tullock竞赛函数  混合生产  博弈论
收稿时间:2020-01-30

Quality Strategy of Pooling Production in a Decentralized Supply Chain
JIANG Yixiu,SONG Bingliang.Quality Strategy of Pooling Production in a Decentralized Supply Chain[J].Industrial Engineering Journal,2021,24(2):43.
Authors:JIANG Yixiu  SONG Bingliang
Affiliation:1. School of Economics & Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China;2. School of Economics and Management, Nantong University, Nantong 226019, China
Abstract:Employing the Tullock contest success function, a noncooperative game model is established to explain how the players compete in the quality contest. The strategy of pooling production definitely brings supplier's quality improvement with comparison to outsourcing while conditionally making the manufacturer's product quality higher than in-house manufacturing. The manufacturer prefers pooling production to outsourcing and in-house manufacturing if the wholesale price charged by the supplier is sufficient low enough. However, the supplier could be hurt by the implementation of pooling production when comparing with outsourcing. Additionally, the manufacturer may prefer a fiercer contest, while the supplier may enjoy a more temperate contest.
Keywords:supply chain quality management  the Tullock contest success function  pooling production  game theory  
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