努力水平影响质押物损耗的存货质押融资合约选择

在质押物是一类易损耗物品的情况下，研究存货质押融资业务中银行对物流企业激励的合约选择问题。考虑物流企业努力水平影响质押物损耗，构建斯坦克尔伯格竞争博弈模型。通过比较共同经营、委托监管、统一授信3种业务模式下银行和物流企业的期望利润，探讨质押物存在损耗情况下银行的合约选择，以及物流企业努力成本系数、质押率和物品损耗率对合约选择的影响。研究结果表明，在物流企业努力成本系数较小时，银行应选择共同经营模式和物流企业进行合作；在货物损耗率较小时，银行应选择委托监管模式；在其他情况下，银行应选择统一授信模式，但银行的质押率不应设置过大。

Contract Selection for Inventory Financing with Effort Level Affecting the Loss of Pledged Goods

In the case that the pledge is a type of consumable item, the contract selection of encouraging a logistics company by a bank in inventory financing business is studied. Considering that the level of effort affects the loss of pledges, a model of Stackleberg competition game is constructed. By comparing the expected profits of the bank and the logistics company under the three business models of joint operation, entrusted supervision and unified credit, the contract choices of the bank in the case of the loss of pledges, and the impact of the logistics company' effort cost coefficient, and pledge and item loss rate on contract selection under different contract models are explored. It is shown that the bank should choose the joint operation mode when the logistics company's effort cost coefficient is small, and consigning supervision mode when the loss rate of the goods is small, in other cases, the bank should choose the unified credit mode cooperating with the logistics company and set smaller pledge rate.