| Abstract: | Outlines an older view of mental representations and shows how this view can provide a unifying framework for interpreting current research. It is argued that the content of awareness may be characterized as a model of the world capable of simulating future events, anticipating present events, and formulating appropriate actions. That is, the mind possesses properties that interact with sensory information to determine conscious experience. The content of awareness consists of constructs that account for sensations by representing patterns of the environment relevant to the set of possible actions that might be taken. Objects are viewed as prototypes for the centrifugal nature of awareness. Empirical evidence from a variety of sources provides support for this notion and helps delineate properties of the model (e.g., amodality, simulation, ambiguity, utility in perception and action). An explicit distinction between the properties of awareness and properties of underlying processes and structures is shown to be useful in accounting for a variety of experimental findings. It is argued that many of these findings must be interpreted as revealing the nature of awareness rather than the nature of underlying structures of processes, which remain obscure. (5 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
