Contract signing, optimism, and advantage |
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| Authors: | Rohit Chadha John C Mitchell Andre Scedrov Vitaly Shmatikov |
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| Affiliation: | aDepartment of Informatics, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9QH, United Kingdom;bDepartment of Computer Science, Gates 476, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305-9045, United States;cDepartment of Mathematics, University of Pennsylvania, 209 South 33rd Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6395, United States;dDepartment of Computer Sciences, The University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station C0500, Austin, TX 78712, United States |
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| Abstract: | A contract signing protocol lets two parties exchange digital signatures on a pre-agreed text. Optimistic contract signing protocols enable the signers to do so without invoking a trusted third party. However, an adjudicating third party remains available should one or both signers seek timely resolution. We analyze optimistic contract signing protocols using a game-theoretic approach and prove a fundamental impossibility result: in any fair, optimistic, timely protocol, an optimistic player yields an advantage to the opponent. The proof relies on a careful characterization of optimistic play that postpones communication to the third party. |
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