| Abstract: | The authors elaborate on the simulation study "Individual Heuristics and Dynamics of Cooperation in Large Groups" by D. M. Messick and W. B. G. Liebrand (see record 1995-17369-001). Messick and Liebrand demonstrated that, in problematic social situations in large groups, stable levels of cooperation can be established even if actors are assumed to be guided by simple behavioral strategies. Among other things, they provided a theory underlying their simulation system. The present article elaborates on Messick and Liebrand's theory and provides a model that predicts the results of simulation runs for a set of simulation systems with more general properties. This enabled deduction of additional, sometimes counterintuitive results. For example, it is shown that it need not be the case that the equilibrium level of cooperation increases with an increasing payoff for mutual cooperation and that it is likely that the equilibrium level of cooperation increases with an increasing payoff for mutual defection. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
