基于委托—代理博弈理论的建筑施工项目经理道德风险模型研究

由于信息不对称和监督约束机制不健全等原因,而且根据“理性人”假设,项目经理为追求自身利益最大化往往倾向于做出有利于自身利益的决策,而这一目标可能和企业利润最大化的目标不一致。文章运用不确定性互不可监督的委托-代理博弈理论研究建筑施工企业项目经理的道德风险模型。

Study on moral hazard model of construction project manager based on consignment-agency theory

Because of asymmetric information,superintend restraint mechanism faultily and the assumption of 'reason people',the project manager will hunt for maximization of self-interest and tend to make policies in acting as self-interest beneficial,but the target possibly disaccord with maximization of the enterprise interest.This article applies consignment-agency game theory and proposes the corresponding countermeasure to the moral risk guard of project manager.