| 国有控股公司寻租监管的对策性分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 孟令春. 国有控股公司寻租监管的对策性分析[J]. 哈尔滨理工大学学报, 2005, 10(6): 77-79 |
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| 作者姓名： | 孟令春 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,安泰管理学院,上海,200030 |
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| 摘 要： | 对如何有效防止国有控股公司及其控股、参股公司高级管理人员的寻租行为和如何实现有效的人事监管进行了研究，相关探讨有利于促进现代公司治理机制的形成，而且对我国国有经济体制改革具有一定意义．通过借助寻租的一般性模型，结合我国部分国有公司具体情况，分析了模型中参数变化所带来的结果和现实意义，从而得出了应硬化惩罚约束并采取管理层分散化制衡来降低寻租行为的结论．
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| 关 键 词： | 国有控股公司 寻租 监管 |
| 文章编号： | 1007-2683(2005)06-0077-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005-04-29 |
Strategic Analysis on Regulation of Corruption in State-holding Company |
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| MENG Ling-chun. Strategic Analysis on Regulation of Corruption in State-holding Company[J]. Journal of Harbin University of Science and Technology, 2005, 10(6): 77-79 |
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| Authors: | MENG Ling-chun |
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| Abstract: | How to prevent corruption of the top managers between state holding company and its holding companies or share-holding companies and how to realize effective regulation,not only facilitates the establishment of modern company governance,but also has a vital bearing on the reform of state-owned enterprises.This article employs a general corruption mode to illuminate the practical results according to the parameter of the mode.And it draws a conclusion that it can relieve the corruption with hardening penalty restriction and dispersing the power of management level which reduces asymmetric information. |
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| Keywords: | state holding company rent-seeking regulation |
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