| Abstract: | This article addresses 2 prominent sources of opposition to physician-assisted suicide (PAS): first, the fear of abuse and, second, common moral distinctions drawn between PAS and other forms of end-of-life decisions and care. Each is grounded in a false assumption that PAS is radically different from other forms of widely accepted end-of-life decisions and care. The experience to date in Oregon gives some reassurance that the practice there permitting PAS has not been significantly abused. Moreover, the author argues that abuse, understood as decisions not in accord with what the patient wants, or would have wanted, is greatest when someone, other than the patient is the decision maker. On this ground, PAS should be less subject to abuse than other surrogate decisions about life support. Moreover, Oregon's law, like virtually all proposals to legalize PAS, contains numerous safeguards that are not present in decisions about life support generally. Second, it is argued that some prominent conceptualizations of accepted end-of-life decisions and care thought to distinguish them morally from PAS fail on closer analysis to do so. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
