决策者失望规避下供应链协同产品创新微分对策研究

在企业与企业之间竞争日趋激烈的背景下,能否在多个企业紧密联系的供应链中通过收益分配高效赋能上下游企业成为决策者撬动协同优势、凝聚创新合力的关键.基于失望理论,运用微分博弈方法针对供应链协同产品创新动态改进与协调进行策略挖掘,将产品创新研发商誉和失望规避因素纳入决策行为之中,在此基础上提出产品创新补贴契约和收益配比调节机制,最后对计算结果进行仿真分析.研究发现:无论在哪种博弈情形下,失望规避系数越大,供应链成员目标利润越低;在一定条件下,创新研发及推广补贴契约的设计与实施,能有效提升受补贴方研发和推广水平、最优收益和供应链整体收益,而提供补贴方的研发努力水平保持不变;将收益分配比率约束在特定的范围内,可有效提高供应链系统的总体绩效,实现协同合作下帕累托最优.

Differential strategies for collaborative product innovation in supply chain under decision makers' disappointed circumvention

Since fierce competition is increasing among enterprises, whether to efficiently empower upstream and downstream enterprises through revenue allocation in the supply chain with multiple enterprises closely linked has become the key for decision-makers to leverage synergistic advantages and gather innovative synergy. Based on the disappointment theory, this study uses the differential game method to explore the strategy of dynamic optimization and coordination of collaborative product innovation in the supply chain.Product innovation R&D goodwill and disappointment avoidance factors are incorporated into the decision-making behavior.On this basis, the product innovation subsidy contract and the revenue matching regulation mechanism are proposed.The simulation results are analyzed in the last step.The results show that the greater the disappointment avoidance coefficient is, the lower the target profit of supply chain members is. Under certain conditions, the design and implementation of subsidy contract for innovation and R&D-promotion can effectively improve the research and development and publicity level, optimal revenue, and overall supply chain revenue of the subsidized party, while the research and development effort level of the subsidized party remains unchanged. Restricting the income distribution ratio of supply chain members to a certain range can effectively improve the present value of supply chain members'' utility and realize Pareto optimization under supply chain coordination.