碳税与减排补贴下混合双寡头企业竞合博弈研究

针对低碳减排背景下，混合双寡头市场中企业与政府的最优决策问题，构建私有企业与部分私有化的公有企业古诺竞争博弈模型、伯特兰德竞争博弈模型以及合作模型。比较3种模型下两企业的最优减排量与产量决策，政府的最优碳税率与减排补贴率决策，两企业目标利润，社会福利与环境污染，并探讨公有企业的私有化水平对最优减排、碳税率、减排补贴率的影响。研究表明：在合作时，两企业有更大的减排力度；在竞争时，公有企业加深私有化水平会促使行业整体提高减排水平；无论是在企业竞争还是合作情形，随着公有企业私有化水平的提高，政府减排措施应该由以碳税为主转变为以碳减排补贴为主。

A Research on the Competition and Cooperation of Mixed Dual Enterprises under Carbon Tax and Carbon Subsidy

Aiming at the decision-making of enterprises and governments in the mixed duopoly market considering carbon emission, three models, namely Cournot competitive game model, Bertrand competitive game model, and cooperative game model, are respectively constructed to study the game between private enterprises and partially privatized public enterprises. Under these three conditions, a comparative study is conducted on the optimal emission reduction amount and corresponding enterprise production decision, the optimal carbon tax rate and subsidy rate decision of the government, the target profit of the two enterprises, and the total social welfare and environmental pollution. Also, the influence of privatization level of the public enterprise on the optimal emission reduction, carbon tax rate and subsidy rate are discussed. Results show that: when cooperating, the two enterprises have the greatest intensity of emission reduction; while under competition condition, the improvement of public enterprises privatization level will promote the emission reduction of the whole industry. In the case of either competition or cooperation, with the improvement of privatization level of public enterprises, government emission reduction measures should be changed from carbon tax to carbon emission reduction subsidy.