基于回收质量不确定与政府双参与的再制造闭环供应链定价策略研究

基于回收质量不确定的现实考虑，运用Stackelberg博弈论方法研究政府补贴和碳税双参与的再制造闭环供应链的定价问题，采用数值仿真的方法量化分析补贴额度和碳税率对再制造闭环供应链定价策略、供应链各成员利润、供应链碳排放量的影响，以及回收质量对再制造闭环供应链的影响。研究发现：政府补贴和碳税的双参与改善了由政府征收碳税而引起的市场不活跃现象，促进了闭环供应链的回收再制造，比单纯补贴或碳税更有效地引导了再制造闭环供应链；无论哪种手段参与，提高废旧产品的回收质量都有助于提高废旧产品的回收量、制造商的利润、第三方回收商的利润以及供应链的总利润，也有助于降低供应链的碳排放。

Study on pricing strategy of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain based on uncertainty of recovery products quality and government double participation

Based on the actual consideration of the uncertainty of recovery products quality, this paper used the Stackelberg game theory to study the pricing decision of remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain under the government subsidy and carbon tax dual mechanism. It compared and analyzed the pricing decisions, profits, and carbon emissions of various members of the supply chain under different government mechanisms, and used the numerical simulation method to analyze the effect of subsidy quota and carbon tax rate on the pricing decision of closed-loop supply chain, the profits of each member in the supply chain, and the carbon emission of the supply chain. At the same time, it also analyzed the impact of recycling quality on the closed-loop supply chain. the results show that compared with the single mechanism, the double participation in subsidy and carbon tax improves the market inactivity caused by the government''s action and promotes the recycling and remanufacturing of the closed-loop supply chain more effectively. No matter under what kind of mechanism, improving the recycling quality of used products increases the recycling of used products, the profit of manufacturer, third-party recycler, and the supply chain, and reduces carbon emission of the supply chain. The content and result of this research provide proposals for the government to adopt suitable policies to promote the sustainable operation of the closed-loop supply chain.