Compromise-resilient anti-jamming communication in wireless sensor networks |
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Authors: | Xuan Jiang Wenhui Hu Sencun Zhu Guohong Cao |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Computer Science and Engineering, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802, USA |
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Abstract: | Jamming is a kind of Denial-of-Service attack in which an adversary purposefully emits radio frequency signals to corrupt
the wireless transmissions among normal nodes. Although some research has been conducted on countering jamming attacks, few
works consider jamming attacks launched by insiders, where an attacker first compromises some legitimate sensor nodes to acquire
the common cryptographic information of the sensor network and then jams the network through those compromised nodes. In this
paper, we address the insider jamming problem in wireless sensor networks. In our proposed solutions, the physical communication
channel of a sensor network is determined by the group key shared by all the sensor nodes. When insider jamming happens, the
network will generate a new group key to be shared only by the non-compromised nodes. After that, the insider jammers are
revoked and will not be able to predict the future communication channels used by the non-compromised nodes. Specifically,
we propose two compromise-resilient anti-jamming schemes: the split-pairing scheme which deals with a single insider jammer, and the key-tree-based scheme which copes with multiple colluding insider jammers. We implement and evaluate the proposed solutions using Mica2
Motes. Experimental results show that our solutions have low recovery latency and low communication overhead, and hence they
are suitable for resource constrained sensor networks. |
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