首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     

农村节能建设推广中的博弈论分析
引用本文:翟明岭,张旭. 农村节能建设推广中的博弈论分析[J]. 建筑节能, 2012, 0(9): 75-79
作者姓名:翟明岭  张旭
作者单位:同济大学机械与能源工程学院,上海 200092
基金项目:“十二五”国家科技支撑计划(2011BAJ08809)
摘    要:分析了农村节能建设的重要性及现存问题。由于经济正外部性的存在以及农村地区节能产品市场供需疲软,需要政府对于农村地区节能产品市场进行激励机制设计,激励机制的目标、激励对象、激励原则以及激励手段得到了分析。利用博弈论对激励机制中的利益主体之间的博弈进行分析,研究了激励机制对节能建设的推进作用,得到不同情况下的博弈结果。根据博弈分析政府应依据激励对象的策略收益确定自己的激励策略。

关 键 词:新农村建设  节能  激励机制  博弈论

Game Theory for Promoting Rural Energy-saving Construction
ZHAI Ming-ling,ZHANG Xu. Game Theory for Promoting Rural Energy-saving Construction[J]. Construction Conserves Energy, 2012, 0(9): 75-79
Authors:ZHAI Ming-ling  ZHANG Xu
Affiliation:(College of Mechanical Engineering, Shanghai 200092, China)
Abstract:The importance of rural energy-saving construction and the existing problems were analyzed. Government's incentive mecha- nism for market of rural energy-saving products is necessary, because of the economic positive externalities and weak market demand and supply of rural energy-saving products. Goal of the incentives, the incentive target, the incentive principle and incentives were expounded. The game between stakeholders of the incentives was explored with game theory, stating the role of incentives. Government's incentive strate- gy should be determined based on the incentive target according to game analysis results.
Keywords:new rural construction  energy efficiency  incentives  game theory
本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号