论瓶颈垄断与行政垄断下的接入规制

自然垄断产业引入竞争后,瓶颈垄断厂商拒绝下游竞争者接入其垄断网络是一种典型的策略性行为,它意在维护纵向一体化垄断、限制下游市场竞争。而行政垄断势力对瓶颈垄断的支持,则会使拒绝接入进一步固化。理论分析表明,拒绝接入会导致自然垄断产业下游竞争性市场关闭和市场化改革倒退,因此需要以接入规制来促进竞争。接入规制包括政府直接规制和反垄断间接规制。由于转型期的瓶颈垄断还具有深厚的行政垄断体制基础,因此接入规制的有效性还仰仗于打破政企不分式的行政垄断。

Access regulation under the bottleneck monopoly and the administrative monopoly

After introducing competition in the natural monopoly industries, accessreject is a typical strategic behavior of the bottleneck monopoly firm which gets hold of the support of the administrative monopoly power. The aim of accessreject is to maintain the monopoly in the vertical - integration market and to limit the competition in the downstream market. Theory analysis shows that access-reject may lead to market foreclosure and retrogression of marketization in the natural monopoly industries. Therefore, access regulation is necessary to push competition. Access regulation ioncludes direct regulation by government and indirect regulation by Anti - trust Law. Because the bottleneck monopoly is usually intertwined with the administrative monopoly, the efficiency of access regulation depends on the break of the latter.