Experiments with probabilistic quantum auctions |
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Authors: | Kay-Yut Chen Tad Hogg |
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Affiliation: | (1) HP Labs, Palo Alto, USA |
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Abstract: | We describe human-subject laboratory experiments on probabilistic auctions based on previously proposed auction protocols
involving the simulated manipulation and communication of quantum states. These auctions are probabilistic in determining
which bidder wins, or having no winner, rather than always having the highest bidder win. Comparing two quantum protocols
in the context of first-price sealed bid auctions, we find the one predicted to be superior by game theory also performs better
experimentally. We also compare with a conventional first-price auction, which gives higher performance. Thus to provide benefits,
the quantum protocol requires more complex economic scenarios such as maintaining privacy of bids over a series of related
auctions or involving allocative externalities.
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Keywords: | Quantum games Quantum economics Auctions Experimental economics |
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