| 国有资本的代理人激励机制模型研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 徐宏毅,张子刚,李晓慧. 国有资本的代理人激励机制模型研究[J]. 武汉大学学报(工学版), 2001, 34(2): 107-109 |
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| 作者姓名： | 徐宏毅 张子刚 李晓慧 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 华中科技大学管理学院,
2. 武汉大学商学院, |
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| 摘 要： | 用委托—代理理论的模型分析国企 (委托人 )与管理者 (代理人 )之间的关系 ,提出激励机制的一个模型 ,并导出该模型的政策含义 .
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| 关 键 词： | 委托—代理 模型 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1006-155X(2001)02-107-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2000-09-17 |
Research on incentivemechanism model for agents of state-owned capital |
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| XU Hong-yi,ZHANG Zi-gang,LI Xiao-hui. Research on incentivemechanism model for agents of state-owned capital[J]. Engineering Journal of Wuhan University, 2001, 34(2): 107-109 |
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| Authors: | XU Hong-yi ZHANG Zi-gang LI Xiao-hui |
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| Affiliation: | XU Hong_yi 1,ZHANG Zi_gang 1,LI Xiao_hui 2 |
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| Abstract: | The relationship between state_owned enterprises (consigners) and managers(agents) is analyzed by using a model of consignment_agency theory. And a new model of incentive mechanism is put forward and its policy meaning is derived also. |
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| Keywords: | consignment_agency incentive mechanism models |
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