Selfish Bin Packing |
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Authors: | Leah Epstein Elena Kleiman |
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Affiliation: | (2) Theory Group, Microsoft Research, Redmond, WA, USA |
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Abstract: | Following recent interest in the study of computer science problems in a game theoretic setting, we consider the well known bin packing problem where the items are controlled by selfish agents. Each agent is charged with a cost according to the fraction of the used bin space its item requires. That is, the cost of the bin is split among the agents, proportionally to their sizes. Thus, the selfish agents prefer their items to be packed in a bin that is as full as possible. The social goal is to minimize the number of the bins used. The social cost in this case is therefore the number of bins used in the packing. |
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