| 技术溢出与最优R&D补贴策略 |
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| 引用本文： | 刘卫民,陈继祥.技术溢出与最优R&D补贴策略[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2009,41(2):208-210. |
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| 作者姓名： | 刘卫民 陈继祥 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200030
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| 摘 要： | 针对R&D补贴对私人创新的激励问题,按照R&D和产量博弈的合作情况,将双寡头企业分为三种组织类型.最优R&D补贴率总是随着技术溢出的增加而增加.通过R&D补贴,完全不合作与半合作可以获得相同结果,而且当技术成果完全共享时,成本降低幅度达到最大值.从利润最大化角度,企业愿意完全合作,但是这将导致社会福利水平最低.
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| 关 键 词： | 研究与发展 补贴 技术溢出 合作 竞争 |
Technological spillovers and optimal R&D subsidy policy |
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| LIU Wei-min,CHEN Ji-xiang.Technological spillovers and optimal R&D subsidy policy[J].Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology,2009,41(2):208-210. |
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| Authors: | LIU Wei-min CHEN Ji-xiang |
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| Affiliation: | (Management School,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China) |
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| Abstract: | Aimed at the effect of R&D subsidy on private innovation,three types of organizations are introduced according to the relationship of the duopoly in R&D and output game.The optimal subsidy is always increasing with the technology spillover.The subsidy leads to the same result in non-cooperation R&D and half-cooperation R&D.If innovation is shared completely,the cost reduction reaches the maximum.Firms would like to select full-cooperation,while this will result in the lowest social welfare. |
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| Keywords: | research and development(R&D) subsidy technology spillover cooperation competition |
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