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基于微分博弈的双渠道广告合作协调策略研究
引用本文:张智勇,李华娟,杨磊,石永强.基于微分博弈的双渠道广告合作协调策略研究[J].控制与决策,2014,29(5):873-879.
作者姓名:张智勇  李华娟  杨磊  石永强
作者单位:华南理工大学经济与贸易学院,广州510006
基金项目:

国家自然科学基金项目(71101054, 71101055);国家社会科学基金项目(12BGL052)

摘    要:

研究在制造商开通网上和零售渠道的情形下, 供应链成员的广告合作和成本分担对双渠道协调的影响. 研究结果表明, 无论零售商的广告对品牌形象产生何种影响, 制造商分担零售商的部分广告费用均能使得双方的利润优于分散决策的情形, 但不能完全实现双渠道协调. 此外, 当零售商也分担制造商的部分广告费用时, 双方均可以实现完全的协调. 相比于零售商频繁促销产生负面影响的情形, 在不产生负面影响的情况下, 双方能够实现更多的价值.



关 键 词:

双渠道|协调|微分博弈|广告合作

收稿时间:2013/1/12 0:00:00
修稿时间:2013/7/23 0:00:00

Dual-channel coordination strategies on advertising cooperation based on differential game
ZHANG Zhi-yong LI Hua-juan YANG Lei SHI Yong-qiang.Dual-channel coordination strategies on advertising cooperation based on differential game[J].Control and Decision,2014,29(5):873-879.
Authors:ZHANG Zhi-yong LI Hua-juan YANG Lei SHI Yong-qiang
Abstract:

The research on the effects of supply chains members’cooperative advertising and costs sharing behavior on dual channel coordination on condition that manufacturer opens online and retail channel at the same time is extended. Research results show that no matter what effect retailer’s promotion has on brand image, when manufacturer pays part of retailer’s advertising cost, the outcome of two members would be better than that in the decentralized channel, but worse than that in the centralized situation. In addition, if the retailer also pays part of manufacturer’s advertising cost, dual channel is fully coordinated. Both members gain more values when retailer’s promotion effect on brand image is not negative.

Keywords:

dual-channel|coordination|differential game|advertising cooperation

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