电源过度投资的博弈分析

我国现阶段的发电投资中,风险在一定程度上被忽略,从而引发了电源的过度投资。利用博弈论的基本原理,对发电过度投资行为进行分析。从市场竞争定价和政府定价2种上网电价定价模式下,分析不同投资规模下的发电企业利润,以获得企业最佳投资规模;分政府及时核准和不及时核准2种情况,进一步给出投资者和政府的静态博弈模型和动态博弈模型。通过对模型的分析,可以得到在信息不完全的情况下的企业与政府博弈结果:政府关停违规机组的概率较小,而发电企业通常会选择违规建设。据此提出,要从加强电力市场建设和提高政府审批效率2个方面抑制电源的过度投资,保证电力工业的可持续发展。

Analysis of over-investment in generation capacity based on game theory

For some investment risks have been neglected,the investment in power industry of China becomes overheated at present.Based on the game theory,this problem has been discussed in this paper.From market pricing and government pricing,the economic benefits of different investments are analyzed to get the best investment scale.Furthermore,the static and dynamic game models are given for government timely approve and delayed approve.After analyzing this model,the game result of incomplete information is that,the probability of closing illegal units is rather small for the government and the illegal construction will be usually chosen for generation companies.Finally,promoting the power market and enhancing the approval efficiency are suggested to restrain the over-investment and keep sustainable development of power industry.