| 企业外部招聘的信号博弈分析 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 孙会,任真礼. 企业外部招聘的信号博弈分析[J]. 淮海工学院学报, 2010, 0(4): 72-74 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 孙会 任真礼 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 淮海工学院商学院,江苏连云港222001 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 淮海工学院哲学社会科学基金资助项目（S2008001） |
| |
| 摘 要： | 企业招聘过程是企业和应聘者在信息不对称下追逐自身利益最大化的信号博弈过程。通过建立企业与应聘者之间的信号博弈模型,指出只有市场完全成功分离均衡才是最理想和最有效率的均衡,实行试用期和合理的薪酬设计,提高包装成本,加大惩罚力度和信用缺失代价以及完善信用机制是实现市场完全成功分离均衡的有效办法。
|
| 关 键 词： | 招聘 信息不对称 信号博弈 均衡分析 |
Signaling Game Analysis of Enterprise Recruitment |
| |
| SUN Hui,REN Zhen-li. Signaling Game Analysis of Enterprise Recruitment[J]. Journal of Huaihai Institute of Technology:Natural Sciences Edition, 2010, 0(4): 72-74 |
| |
| Authors: | SUN Hui REN Zhen-li |
| |
| Affiliation: | (School of Business, Huaihai Institute of Technology, Lianyungang 222001, China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Enterprise recruitment is a signaling game process where enterprises and applicants try to maximize their own interest under information asymmetry. By establishing the signaling game model between enterprises and applicants, we pointed out that the separated equilibrium of a completely successful market is the most ideal and efficient equilibrium. Effective measures to a- chieve such a goal include the adoption of a probationary period, a reasonable design of wages and compensations, the increase of packaging cost, the enhancement of penalty and the perfection of credit mechanism. |
| |
| Keywords: | recruitment information asymmetry signaling game equilibrium analysis |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
