基于外部性的既有建筑节能改造业主进化博弈行为分析

既有建筑节能改造过程中主体的策略选择行为非常重要。基于外部性和有限理性的分析框架，分别建立了在没有政府行政干预和有经济激励措施下的业主间节能改造的进化博弈模型，通过业主间的博弈，分别分析了业主针对节能改造的“进化稳定策略”和“复制动态”。模型表明，业主节能改造的“进化稳定策略”及“复制动态”受节能改造外部性的影响，并与节能改造的收益大小以及激励政策的强度紧密相关。因而，政府应加大经济激励政策力度以使外部性内部化，使业主的节能改造“复制动态”趋向并稳定于节能改造，并提出既有建筑节能改造的外部性定量化作为下一步的研究方向。

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Owners Behavior Based on Externality in Energy Efficiency Renovation of Existing Buildings

It’s important to analyze the strategy choices of market entities in energy efficiency renovation of existing buildings. Based on the analysis framework of externality and bounded rationality，this paper establishes evolutionary game model among owners in energy efficiency renovation of existing buildings without government administrative intervention and with economic incentive policies respectively. Owners′ evolutionarily stable strategy（ESS）and replicated dynamics through game analysis among owners are analyzed. The models show that evolutionary stable strategy and replicated dynamics are affected by externality and closely related to energy efficiency renovation benefits and incentive intensity. It is reasoned out that government should increase economic incentive policy efforts to make the externality internalization and make owners′ replicated dynamics tend toward energy efficiency renovation.