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Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory
Authors:Stephen Morris  Hyun Song Shin
Affiliation:(1) Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, U.S.A.;(2) Nuffield College, Oxford, OX1 1NF, U.K.
Abstract:The importance of the notion of common knowledge in sustaining cooperative outcomes in strategic situations is well appreciated. However, the systematic analysis of the extent to which small departures from common knowledge affect equilibrium in games has only recently been attempted.We review the main themes in this literature, in particular, the notion of common p-belief. We outline both the analytical issues raised, and the potential applicability of such ideas to game theory, computer science and the philosophy of language.
Keywords:Common knowledge  common belief  coordination  game theory  protocols  language
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