Network security threat assessment based on the signaling game

Nowadays, researches on network security defense based on game theory mostly use completed information or static game theory to establish the attack-defense model. In order to perform security threat assessment in a closer way to the practical situation in a network, this paper proposes a network attack-defense game model based on the signaling game, which is modeled in a dynamic and uncompleted way. After putting forward the solving process of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the signaling game, this paper analyzes all kinds of equilibriums existing in the game. Taking the posterior belief as the defender's prediction of the attacker's type, this paper puts forward the assessment algorithm for the network security threat based on the model above, predicts the security threat the defender is facing, and provides the security threat grade for the evaluator. Finally, the feasibility and validity of the model and the method proposed by this paper are testified through the analysis of a network example.