基于碳排放限额和低碳销售努力的博弈模型分析及控制

以双渠道供应链为研究对象,在考虑碳排放限额和低碳销售努力的基础上,分别构建单周期静态博弈模型和多周期动态博弈模型,研究最优决策和系统稳定性问题.在静态模型中,给出集中决策和分散决策下的最优策略解析式;在动态模型中,探究博弈系统的局部渐近稳定性条件,讨论时滞等参数对系统稳定性的影响,并对失稳系统进行有效控制. 研究表明:提高碳排放限额能够增加供应链系统利润;随着低碳销售努力的增加,供应链系统利润和制造商利润均呈下降趋势;不合理的延迟策略将导致系统失去稳定.

Analysis and control of game model based on carbon emission quota and low carbon sales efforts

Considering the carbon emission quota and low carbon sales efforts in the dual-channel supply chain, the single period static game model and the multi-period dynamic game model are constructed to explore the optimal decision and the system stability respectively. In the static model, the optimal decision analytic formulas under the centralized decision and the decentralized decision are given. In the dynamic model, the local asymptotic stability conditions of the game system are explored, and the effect of delay parameters on the stability of the system is discussed. In addition, the instability system is effectively controlled. The study shows that the increase of carbon emission quota can increase the profit of the supply chain system; with the increase of low carbon sales efforts, the profits of the supply chain system and manufacturer will be reduced; the unreasonable delay parameter will lead to instability of the system.