| 不完全信息动态博弈下反倾销税率优化模型 |
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| 引用本文： | 钟根元,周斌,许源. 不完全信息动态博弈下反倾销税率优化模型[J]. 哈尔滨工业大学学报, 2006, 38(1): 104-106 |
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| 作者姓名： | 钟根元 周斌 许源 |
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| 作者单位： | 上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200052;上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200052;上海交通大学,管理学院,上海,200052 |
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| 摘 要： | 指出了世界贸易组织及我国政府计算反倾销税率所依据的倾销幅度公式时应考虑的三大因素.建立了在不完全信息动态博弈下的反倾销税率定价的优化模型.发现了优化的反倾销税率的确定与出口产品在国外市场上产品销售的价格(即正常价值)无关,与在国内市场上销售的产品价格(即出口价格)有关,且受国内市场上消费者的需求弹性、国内外企业生产产品的单位边际成本影响,提出了应根据在国内产业所遭受损害程度(不一定是倾销行为所造成)的范围内来确定反倾销税率并对我国政府及出口企业提出了政策建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 不完全信息动态博弈 反倾销税率 优化模型 |
| 文章编号： | 0367-6234(2006)01-0104-03 |
| 收稿时间： | 2004-02-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004-02-03 |
Optimal model of AD duty rate under incomplete dynamic game |
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| ZHONG Gen-yuan,ZHOU Bin,XU Yuan. Optimal model of AD duty rate under incomplete dynamic game[J]. Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology, 2006, 38(1): 104-106 |
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| Authors: | ZHONG Gen-yuan ZHOU Bin XU Yuan |
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| Affiliation: | Aetna School of Management, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai 200052, China |
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| Abstract: | At first, according to the relevant economic theories, the author points out the disadvantages of the formula of dumping margin on which the antidumping rate used by the WTO and our domestic government depends. Then, the author concludes the optimal model of working out the antidumping duty rate under incomplete and dynamic information by means of the relevant theories of economics, g ame theory. At last, the author analyses the factors impacting the antidumping rate while providing our government some suggestions on determining the antidumping rate and giving domestic firms some advices during investigation cases. |
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| Keywords: | incomplete dynamic game anti-dumping duty rate optimal model |
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