基于Stackelberg博弈的光伏用户群优化定价模型

在由多主体组成的光伏用户群中,用户间存在光伏电量共享。然而,在现有的分布式光伏上网政策下,用户间的共享水平很低。为了提高用户间光伏电量共享水平,根据用户的用电特性,构建了光伏用户群内的多买方—多卖方格局。结合中国的分布式光伏上网政策,运营商作为主导者,以其收益最大化为目的,制定光伏用户群内部电价。用户作为跟随者,基于运营商发布的内部电价进行需求响应,最大化自身用电效益,用户需求响应的结果同时也会影响运营商的收益。通过分析该电力市场中运营商和用户的行为特性,提出了基于Stackelberg博弈的需求响应模型,并证明了该博弈均衡点的存在性和唯一性。算例结果表明,在该光伏用户群中,运营商通过制定内部电价,能够有效提高自身收益以及用户用电效益,并明显提升了光伏用户群内光伏电量共享水平,验证了所提模型的有效性。

Stackelberg Game Based Optimal Pricing Model for Photovoltaic Prosumer Cluster

In the photovoltaic(PV)prosumer cluster composed by multi-entities, there is PV power sharing between prosumers. The sharing level is pretty low due to the distributed PV feed-in-tariff policy at present. To enhance the sharing level, a multi-buyer and multi-seller structure is built in PV prosumer cluster according to prosumers'' load characteristics. PV prosumer cluster operator is the leader, and the internal price is settled to maximize the profit considering the utility of prosumers and the distributed PV feed-in-tariff policy in China. Prosumers act as follower and will maximize their utility by response to the internal price. The demand response(DR)model based on Stackelberg game is built according to the behavioral characteristics of operator and prosumers, and the equilibrium of this game is proved to be exist and unique. It can be demonstrated that operator''s profit and prosumers'' utility can be increased by internal price, which is settled by the operator, and the PV power sharing level is also enhanced in the PV prosumer cluster. The effectiveness of model is verified in the case study. This work is supported by National High Technology Research and Development Program of China(863 Program)(No. 2014AA052001).