Helen Keller Was Never in a Chinese Room |
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Authors: | Email author" target="_blank">Jason?FordEmail author |
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Affiliation: | (1) Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Duluth, 315 A. B. Anderson Hall, 1121 University Drive, Duluth, MN 55812-3027, USA |
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Abstract: | William Rapaport, in “How Helen Keller used syntactic semantics to escape from a Chinese Room,” (Rapaport 2006), argues that Helen Keller was in a sort of Chinese Room, and that her subsequent development of natural language fluency
illustrates the flaws in Searle’s famous Chinese Room Argument and provides a method for developing computers that have genuine
semantics (and intentionality). I contend that his argument fails. In setting the problem, Rapaport uses his own preferred
definitions of semantics and syntax, but he does not translate Searle’s Chinese Room argument into that idiom before attacking
it. Once the Chinese Room is translated into Rapaport’s idiom (in a manner that preserves the distinction between meaningful
representations and uninterpreted symbols), I demonstrate how Rapaport’s argument fails to defeat the CRA. This failure brings
a crucial element of the Chinese Room Argument to the fore: the person in the Chinese Room is prevented from connecting the
Chinese symbols to his/her own meaningful experiences and memories. This issue must be addressed before any victory over the
CRA is announced. |
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