Security by facility design for sabotage protection

Facility design of nuclear power plant (NPP) for a sabotage protection is investigated and an effect of the design change for damage control on reduction of sabotage risk is shown using the vital area identification methodology. In a sabotage incident, it is not straightforward to identify the most credible scenario for NPP. However, the loss of offsite power leading to the station blackout is assumed to be a typical example for further evaluation. In this study, the vulnerability of vital area is considered in terms of the accessibility, the distribution of vital equipment, and the adversary's interference. As seen in the past report, the built-in measures for damage control are important in case of the existence of adversary's interference until neutralization. It is confirmed that not only the physical protection system, but also the facility design on structures, systems, and components play an important role in the effective and efficient sabotage protection. To reduce any vulnerability in the design of NPP, it is very important to introduce a security by design approach in an initial stage of the NPP construction while considering the interface between safety and security.