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考虑政府补贴及环境设计的再制造闭环供应链生产决策
引用本文:姚锋敏,闫颍洛,刘珊,滕春贤. 考虑政府补贴及环境设计的再制造闭环供应链生产决策[J]. 控制与决策, 2022, 37(10): 2637-2646
作者姓名:姚锋敏  闫颍洛  刘珊  滕春贤
作者单位:哈尔滨理工大学 经济与管理学院, 哈尔滨 150080
基金项目:中央支持地方高校改革发展资金人才培养项目(2021);国家自然科学基金项目(71701056);黑龙江省自然科学基金项目(G2018007).
摘    要:在外包及授权再制造模式下,研究考虑政府补贴及制造商环境设计的再制造闭环供应链生产决策问题.构建4种闭环供应链决策模型,分析政府补贴及环境设计水平对制造商与再制造商竞合关系、闭环供应链绩效以及环境的影响.研究发现,制造商可以通过调节单位再制造外包费或专利许可费实现与再制造商共享政府补贴,因此政府不同补贴策略不会对闭环供应链最优生产决策及绩效产生影响.政府补贴与消费者对再制造产品的认知程度,并不总是有利于提高制造商环境设计水平,但均有助于促进再制造产品销售.制造商总是有动机进行环境设计,而再制造商只有在环境设计能为再制造产品带来更多成本节约时,才有动力接受制造商的环境设计方案.相比于授权再制造,制造商及再制造商均在外包再制造下获得更多的利润.另外,政府补贴与环境设计并不一定总能起到减少产品环境总影响程度的作用.

关 键 词:闭环供应链  政府补贴  环境设计  外包再制造  授权再制造  生产决策

Production decision for remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain considering government subsidies and environment design
YAO Feng-min,YAN Ying-luo,LIU Shan,TENG Chun-xian. Production decision for remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain considering government subsidies and environment design[J]. Control and Decision, 2022, 37(10): 2637-2646
Authors:YAO Feng-min  YAN Ying-luo  LIU Shan  TENG Chun-xian
Affiliation:School of Economics and Management,Harbin University of Science and Technology,Harbin 150080,China
Abstract:Under the outsourcing and authorizing remanufacturing, the production decision for remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) considering government subsidies and manufacturer''s design for environment is researched. Four CLSC decision models are constructed to analyze the effects of government subsidies and environment design investment on the competition and cooperation between manufacturers and remanufacturers as well as the performance of the CLSC. It shows that the manufacturer can share the government subsidies with the remanufacturer by adjusting unit remanufacturing outsourcing fee or patent licensing fee, so the different subsidy strategies of the government will not affect the optimal production decision and performance of the CLSC. The government subsidies and consumer acceptance degree of remanufactured products are not always conducive to increasing the manufacturer''s design level for environment, but both contribute to promoting the sale of remanufactured products. The manufacturer always has an incentive to invest in design for the environment, and the remanufacturer will only be motivated to accept the environmental design solutions if it can bring more cost savings to the remanufactured product. Compared with the licensed remanufacturing, both the manufacturer and remanufacturer will gain more profits under the outsourced remanufacturing. In addition, government subsidies and environmental design may not always play a role in reducing the total environmental impact of products.
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