中央与地方政府关于土地政策的博弈分析

地方政府为了增加财政收入，促进地方经济的快速发展和追求政绩，常常利用自身具有的优势违背中央的土地政策。这使得中央政府的土地政策难以发挥保护耕地和粮食安全，维护农民利益等作用，从而加剧了中央与地方政府的土地政策博弈。在分析中央与地方政府土地政策博弈现状的基础上，为了更好地实现博弈双方的利益，建立了激励相容机制，即通过委托代理模型来实现中央与地方政府博弈的利益分配。并根据博弈分析结果给出了相应的建议与措施，从而更好地实现国家宏观调控政策。

Game Analysis of the Central and Local Governments on Land Policy

To increase fiscal revenue and promote the rapid development of local economy and the pursuit of performance, local governments often use their advantage against the central land policy. This makes the land policy of the central government difficult to play its role in the protection of arable land central and local governments. In order to food security and interests of farmers, achieve better the interests of both thus exacerbates land policy game between the sides of the game, mechanism of incentive compatibility is established through the principal-agent model to realize the profit distribution of the central and local government game. According to the above game analysis results, corresponding advice and measures are given to achieve better national macroeconomic regulation and control policy.