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成本补酬合同中监理方与承包方之间的博弈模型研究
引用本文:朱翔华,刘伊生. 成本补酬合同中监理方与承包方之间的博弈模型研究[J]. 南昌水专学报, 2005, 24(4): 67-70
作者姓名:朱翔华  刘伊生
作者单位:北京交通大学经济管理学院,北京100044
摘    要:以成本补酬合同为例,建立了监理方与承包方之间的博弈模型,并对此模型进行分析,找到了他们之间关系的均衡点,求出了他们各自努力程度的关系式.并对博弈均衡的结果进行了分析,从行业主管、业主方、监理方和承包方各自的角度出发,提出了加强工程管理的一些措施.

关 键 词:成本补酬合同  完全信息静态博弈  混合战略  纳什均衡
文章编号:1006-4869(2005)04-0067-04
修稿时间:2005-10-12

Research on the Game Between Supervisor and Contractor in Cost-Plus-Percentage-Fee Contract
ZHU Xiang-hua,LIU Yi-sheng. Research on the Game Between Supervisor and Contractor in Cost-Plus-Percentage-Fee Contract[J]. Journal of Nanchang College of Water Conservancy and Hydroelectric Power, 2005, 24(4): 67-70
Authors:ZHU Xiang-hua  LIU Yi-sheng
Abstract:Based on the cost-plus-percentage-fee contract,this paper applies the game theory to studying the game between the supervisor and the contractor.It sets up the game model between these two players,works out the equilibrium point of their benefits and the equations of their struggling degrees.After the analyses of the equilibrium outcome of this game,we put forward some advice on enforcing the construction management and improving the investment benefit from the points of view of client,supervisor,contractor and governor.
Keywords:cost-plus-percentage-fee contract  full-information static theory game  mixed strategy  nash equilibrium  
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