Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 2-Advanced concepts and results |
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Authors: | Dinesh Garg Y. Narahari Sujit Gujar |
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Affiliation: | (1) IBM India Research Laboratory, Bangalore, 560 071, India;(2) Electronic Commerce Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 560 012, India |
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Abstract: | Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. In the first part of this tutorial on mechanism design (Garg et al 2008), we looked into the key notions and classical results in mechanism design theory. In the current part of the tutorial, we build upon the first part and undertake a study of several other key issues in mechanism design theory. |
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Keywords: | Mechanism design game theory social choice functions auctions |
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