首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     


Foundations of mechanism design: A tutorial Part 2-Advanced concepts and results
Authors:Dinesh Garg  Y. Narahari  Sujit Gujar
Affiliation:(1) IBM India Research Laboratory, Bangalore, 560 071, India;(2) Electronic Commerce Laboratory, Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore, 560 012, India
Abstract:Mechanism design, an important tool in microeconomics, has found widespread applications in modelling and solving decentralized design problems in many branches of engineering, notably computer science, electronic commerce, and network economics. In the first part of this tutorial on mechanism design (Garg et al 2008), we looked into the key notions and classical results in mechanism design theory. In the current part of the tutorial, we build upon the first part and undertake a study of several other key issues in mechanism design theory.
Keywords:Mechanism design  game theory  social choice functions  auctions
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号