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浅析信息不对称下的工程监理激励与监控
引用本文:左剑. 浅析信息不对称下的工程监理激励与监控[J]. 城市建筑, 2014, 0(27): 166-166
作者姓名:左剑
作者单位:湖南雁城建设咨询有限公司,衡阳421001
摘    要:在市场经济下,信息的不对称现象普遍存在。这种现象会给双方的利益带来一定的风险,使得双方容易发生一些不必要的冲突。因此,制定行之有效的工程监理激励与监控模式,对改善双方由信息不对称产生的冲突情况有着重要的作用和意义。

关 键 词:工程监理  激励  监控  机制  业主

Discussion on the Incentive and Monitoring of Engineering Supervision under Asymmetric Information
Zuo Jian. Discussion on the Incentive and Monitoring of Engineering Supervision under Asymmetric Information[J]. Urbanism and Architecture, 2014, 0(27): 166-166
Authors:Zuo Jian
Abstract:In a market economy, information asymmetry uni-versal is common. This phenomenon wil bring certain risks to the interests of both sides, so that both sides are prone to a number of unnecessary conflicts. Therefore, the formulation of incentive and monitoring model of effective engineering sup-ervision plays an important role and has significance to im-prove the conflict situation of both sides caused by information asymmetry.
Keywords:engineering supervision  incentive  monitoring  mechanism  owners
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