| 政府部门与质量监督机构之间委托代理行为 |
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| 引用本文： | 郭汉丁,刘应宗,郝海.政府部门与质量监督机构之间委托代理行为[J].华中科技大学学报(城市科学版),2005,22(2):42-44. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郭汉丁 刘应宗 郝海 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072;山西师范大学基建处,山西,临汾,041004
2. 天津大学,管理学院,天津,300072 |
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| 基金项目： | 天津市建委软科学研究计划项目(2001-软-7). |
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| 摘 要： | 建设工程质量监督行业在政府委托执法过程中,政府部门与质量监督机构之间存在逆向选择、道德风险、X-无效率和寻租行为.应用博弈论中的委托代理模型可以有效地揭示他们之间的行为策略特征,保证质量执法监督的有效性,使监督机构实现其自身利益最大化的同时,必须实现政府部门追求的建设工程质量利益最大化.这就需要政府部门在制定监督政策时,引入激励机制,通过调整监督机构收益的构成结构,调动监督机构执法监督的积极性,实现建设工程质量有效监督的目的.
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| 关 键 词： | 政府部门 质量监督机构 建设工程质量 委托代理 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1672-7037(2005)02-0042-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年12月20 |
Principal-agent Action Between Government Departments and Supervision Organizations |
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| GUO Han-ding,LIU Ying-zong,HAO Hai.Principal-agent Action Between Government Departments and Supervision Organizations[J].Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology,2005,22(2):42-44. |
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| Authors: | GUO Han-ding LIU Ying-zong HAO Hai |
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| Affiliation: | GUO Han-ding~ |
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| Abstract: | There are adverse selection, moral hazard, X-inefficiency and rent seeking acti on in government supervision industry of construction quality. Principal-agent matrix can effectively reveal the traits of action tactics between gover nment departments and supervision organizations. This can realize the greatest b enefit of government departments for construction quality at the same time when supervision organizations realize their benefits. The result provides efficiency for government supervision. Government departments should introduce incentive s ystem during formulating a supervisory policy in order to arouse the enthusiasm of the supervision organizations. |
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| Keywords: | government department supervision organizati ons of quality construction quality principal-agent incentive system |
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