| 腐败与反腐：经济博弈分析与政策含义 |
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| 引用本文： | 董志强,刘婷.腐败与反腐：经济博弈分析与政策含义[J].重庆工学院学报,2004,18(5):53-55. |
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| 作者姓名： | 董志强 刘婷 |
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| 作者单位： | [1]重庆工学院经济与贸易学院,重庆400050 [2]重庆市大渡口区建胜镇人民政府,重庆400082 |
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| 基金项目： | 重庆工学院青年基金项目 ( 2 0 0 3ZQ13 ) |
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| 摘 要： | 将腐败看作官员的理性选择行为结果，建立了官员和政府之间的腐败与反腐败博弈模型。模型表明：反腐应以中层官员为重点；高薪养廉并非好政策；反腐政策重在增加腐败行为的成本和降低政府反腐的成本系数。
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| 关 键 词： | 经济博弈 政策含义 政府 博弈模型 增加 腐败行为 官员 反腐败 高薪养廉 理性选择 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-0924(2004)05-0053-03 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年3月1日 |
Corruption and Anti-corruption: Economic Game Analysis and Policy Connotations |
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| DONG Zhi-qiang,LIU Ting.Corruption and Anti-corruption: Economic Game Analysis and Policy Connotations[J].Journal of Chongqing Institute of Technology,2004,18(5):53-55. |
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| Authors: | DONG Zhi-qiang LIU Ting |
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| Affiliation: | DONG Zhi-qiang~1,LIU Ting~2 |
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| Abstract: | Considering corruption as a result from officials' rational choice behaviors, this paper establishes a game model to describe the relation between officials' corruption and government's anticorruption. The model suggests that in anticorruption emphasis should be put mainly on middle level officials; and high salary for anti-corruption is not a good policy; and the anti-corruption policies should focus on increase the costs of corruption behavior and reduce the cost coefficient of anti-corruption. |
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| Keywords: | corruption game reform |
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