考虑风险规避与质量和服务水平的VMI供应链期权协调策略

针对一个考虑风险规避供应商与质量和服务水平的二级VMI供应链,应用条件风险价值(CVaR)准则刻画供应商的风险规避行为,提出由期权和成本分担构成的组合契约,构建以零售商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链协调策略以及风险规避对供应链协调和利润分配的影响.研究表明,供应商的最优生产量随着其风险规避程度的增加而减小,但最优质量和服务水平与风险规避程度无关;当且仅当供应商风险规避程度较低时供应链才能实现协调,且供应商风险规避程度是影响供应链契约设计和利润分配的关键因素.

Option coordination strategy for VMI supply chain with a risk-averse supplier based on quality and service level

In a vendor-managed inventory(VMI) supply chain coordination problem with a risk-averse supplier under product quality and customer service investment, the conditional value-at-risk(CVaR) criterion is adopted to model risk aversion of the supplier, and a combined contract composed of option and cost sharing is proposed to investigate coordination and profit allocation issues of the supply chain with a Stackelberg game in which the retailer acts as the leader. It is found that the supplier''s optimal production quantity decreases as the risk aversion coefficient increases, while both optimal quality and service levels are independent on the risk aversion coefficient. Furthermore, coordination of the supply chain is achievable only when the supplier is low in risk aversion, and the supplier''s risk aversion is a significant factor for contract design and profit allocation.