| 政府投资工程代建制模式下的委托代理分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 邓曦,刘幸. 政府投资工程代建制模式下的委托代理分析[J]. 武汉理工大学学报, 2007, 29(4): 148-151 |
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| 作者姓名： | 邓曦 刘幸 |
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| 作者单位： | 武汉大学土木建筑工程学院,武汉,430072 |
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| 摘 要： | 根据委托-代理理论建立了政府投资工程代建制模式下的委托-代理模型，分析了相关变量对激励强度的影响，并在激励模型中引入监理方，从而减小委托方和代理方的信息不对称，抑制道德风险，为我国代建制的发展提供有益的启示。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府投资工程 代建制 委托代理关系 激励机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1671-4431(2007)04-0148-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2006-12-13 |
Analysis of Principal-agent Relationship Under Agent Construction Management Mode of Government Investment Projects |
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| DENG Xi,LIU Xing. Analysis of Principal-agent Relationship Under Agent Construction Management Mode of Government Investment Projects[J]. Journal of Wuhan University of Technology, 2007, 29(4): 148-151 |
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| Authors: | DENG Xi LIU Xing |
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| Abstract: | According to principal-agent theory,the principal-agent model was established.And the influence of related variables on the sensitiveness of compensation performance was analysized.Introducing surveillant into incentive model will decrease asymmetric information between principal and agent and suppress moral risk.It can provide beneficial inspiration for the development of agent construction management mode in our country. |
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| Keywords: | government investment projects agent construction management mode principal-agent relationship incentive system |
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