动态背景下考虑顾客退货影响的供应链协调问题

在考虑店铺辅助服务降低顾客退货率的基础上,构建微分博弈模型并研究供应链的店铺辅助策略和供应链的协调问题.首先,利用微分对策理论,给出集中和分散两种决策模式下定价和店铺辅助的最优策略,并对两种决策模式下最优策略进行比较分析;然后,为了提升分散决策下供应链的利润,设计二部收费制契约,实现动态背景下供应链的协调;最后,通过数值算例分析店铺辅助努力和店铺辅助水平效率对供应链最优解及协调的影响.研究发现:集中决策下店铺辅助努力高于分散决策下的相应值,具有较高的店铺服务水平,但两种决策结构下的价格高低依赖于系统参数;契约的协调能力会随着店铺辅助努力或服务水平效率的增加而变强.

Coordinating a supply chain with consumer returns in dynamic setting

By considering the store-assistance service on reducing the rate of consumer return, the differential game model is established, and the problems of the store assistance decision and channel coordination are studied. Firstly, the optimal strategies of the retail price and store assistance are given in the decentralized and centralized decisions by applying the differential game theory. Also, the comparison analysis concerning on the optimal strategies is given in two decision patterns. Then, a two-part tariff contract is designed to increase the profit under the decentralized decision, and coordinate the supply chain in the dynamic setting. Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the effects of the efficiency of the store assistance effort and store-assistance level on the optimal solutions and coordination. It is shown that the store assistance effort under the centralized decision is higher than the one under the decentralized decision, and the relationship of retail prices under two decision patterns depends on the system parameters. In addition, the coordination capability of the two-part tariff contract is improved by increasing the store-assistance effort effectiveness or the store-assistance level effectiveness.