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IPD 模式下项目团队激励机制设计与分析
引用本文:王玉洁,苏振民,佘小颉. IPD 模式下项目团队激励机制设计与分析[J]. 工程管理学报, 2013, 0(4): 72-76
作者姓名:王玉洁  苏振民  佘小颉
作者单位:1,2. 南京工业大学土木工程学院;3. 江苏顺通建设集团有限公司
摘    要:在分析传统项目交付方式下激励机制相关模型的基础上,结合项目集成交付(Integrated Project Delivery,IPD)区别于传统项目交付方式的特点,假设联盟内各团队风险中性,通过构建激励基本模型,分析了以团队为单位进行激励时激励机制的设计方法。通过对激励模型的分析,得出IPD 模式下设计团队激励机制时应该通过设计线性激励契约来促使联盟内成员为项目的公共利益而合作,以创造最大化的联盟值为目标,达到各团队努力水平的帕累托最优。

关 键 词:IPD  项目团队  风险中性  激励模型  帕累托最优

Project Team Incentive Mechanism Design and Analysis in IPD Mode
WANG Yu-jie,SU Zhen-min,SHE Xiao-jie. Project Team Incentive Mechanism Design and Analysis in IPD Mode[J]. Journal of Engineering Management, 2013, 0(4): 72-76
Authors:WANG Yu-jie  SU Zhen-min  SHE Xiao-jie
Affiliation:1,2. College of Civil Engineering,Nanjing University of Technology; 3. Jiangsu Shuntong Construction Group Co.,Ltd.
Abstract:The article analyses the incentive mechanism of the traditional project delivery mode,and combines it with the featuresof Integrated project delivery (IPD) that are different from the traditional project delivery mode,assumes that the teams in thealliance are risk neutral,and analyses the design method of team incentive mechanism by constructing the basic incentive model.Because of the open and transparent communication and cooperation in the alliance,the model in the article ignores the impact ofasymmetric information on the parties to choose their action levels. By analyzing the incentive model,the article concludes that it isnecessary to design linear incentive contracts to urge members of the alliance to work and cooperate for public interest and maximumtarget value in the IPD mode. And finally the effort level of each team reaches the pareto optimality.
Keywords:IPD  project team  risk neutral  incentive model  pareto optimality
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