博弈论在施工企业管理中的应用

在介绍建设项目特殊性和施工项目实施中存在信息非对称性的基础上，揭示了项目经理可能存在的机会主义行为和施工企业与项目经理之间的博弈关系，然后运用委托一代理理论，建立了两种风险态度下的企业与项目经理的博弈模型，证明了只有在项目经理为风险中性时，施工企业内部推行项目承包制，企业才能获取最大利润，项目经理不存在机会主义行为；也分析了当项目经理为风险厌恶时，最优激励机制必然存在机会主义，损害了施工企业的利益，此时只有提高激励程度和加强外在监督约束才能消除或削弱项目经理的机会主义行为。

Application of Game Theory to the Construction Corporation Management

Based on the introduction of particularity of the construction project and asymmetric information in its implementation, it shows that the project manager may have opportunism behavior, which affects the construction corporation and project manager. A principal-agent theory is applied to set up two models under different risk attitude and which proved that only if the agent were risk-neutral, the principal would get the maximum profit by leasing the project. The opportunism behavior does appear in the optimal incentive mechanism when the agent is risk-avoiding and it is harmful to the principal's benefit. The fundamental way to eliminate opportunism is enhancing the incentive intensity and enforcing outside monitoring and binding mechanism.