基于委托-代理模型的施工过程成本博弈

施工项目管理者的成本控制目标是,通过激励契约达到成本控制要求,提高成本控制效率.但是管理者运用激励机制控制单位产品成本具有片面性,没有考虑工人为了提高成本控制效率需要付出一定的精力和时间,从而影响其收益以及降低生产成本的积极性,因此,管理者和工人会围绕产品成本降低产生的收益分配形成动态成本博弈.对此,提出建设项目背景下基于单位时间的委托代理模型.通过分析发现:工人努力程度与激励系数呈非线性正相关;在一定范围内,工人的收益会随着努力程度的提高先增加并达到峰值后再减少;在工人努力程度达到最优时,管理者的收益会随激励系数的提高而增加并达到峰值.通过设置合理的激励系数能使管理者和工人的收益达到最优.最后以钢筋制作搭接工序为例,分析模型的可行性.

Construction process cost game based on principal-agent model

The cost control goal of the construction project manager is to meet the requirement of cost control and improve the efficiency of cost control through the incentive contract. But it is incomplete that managers use the incentive mechanism to control the cost of unit product without considering the time and energy of workers spent to improve the efficiency of cost control, which affects their benefit and enthusiasm of reducing the cost of production. Thus a dynamic cost game is formed between managers and workers around the profit distribution generated by reduction of product cost. This paper proposes a principal-agent model based on unit time under the background of construction project. It is found that the level of workers'' effort has nonlinear positive correlation with the incentive ratio; the workers'' profit will increase to the peak firstly and then decrease with the increases of workers'' effort level in a certain range; when the level of workers'' effort is optimal, the managers'' profit increase to the peak with the increase of incentive ratio. By setting a reasonable incentive ratio, managers and workers can achieve the maximum profit. Finally, the feasibility of the model is analyzed with the example of rebar making and bonding process.