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"非典"疫情扩散和防治中的博弈分析
引用本文:陶凤翔,谭跃进,迟研,邓宏钟. "非典"疫情扩散和防治中的博弈分析[J]. 上海工程技术大学学报, 2003, 17(3): 189-192. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1009-444X.2003.03.007
作者姓名:陶凤翔  谭跃进  迟研  邓宏钟
作者单位:国防科技大学,人文与管理学院,长沙,410073
摘    要:首先对"非典"疫情在华北地区爆发时医院之间的关系进行博弈分析,然后在分析研究政府与防治"非典"单位抗击"非典"过程中的关系的基础上,建立了监督博弈模型,并依此确定监察机关对防治单位进行检查的比例.通过对政府与医院间博弈关系的分析研究,得到政府在疫情的不同时期对医院和其他防治单位的监管力度、惩罚尺度与发病率和医院利润的函数关系.

关 键 词:"  非典"  防治   博弈论   监督博弈
文章编号:1009-444X(2003)03-0189-04
修稿时间:2003-06-13

Game Analyses on Pervasion and Prevention of SARS
TAO feng-xiang,TAN Yue-jin,CHI Yan,DENG Hong-zhong. Game Analyses on Pervasion and Prevention of SARS[J]. Journal of Shanghai University of Engineering Science, 2003, 17(3): 189-192. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1009-444X.2003.03.007
Authors:TAO feng-xiang  TAN Yue-jin  CHI Yan  DENG Hong-zhong
Abstract:Firstly the game relationship between hospitals in North China at the beginning of SARS is analyzed. Then on the basis of research into the relationship between the Government and the units that are responsible for preventing and cure during the process of fighting against SARS, this paper establishes a game model for supervision, and gives out the proportions of preventing-and-cure units that supervising organs should inspect. The study shows the relations among the incidence of SARS, hospital profit, the control and the punish strength of the Government to hospitals and other preventing-and-cure units in epidemic situations.
Keywords:Prevention and cure of SARS  Game theory  Supervise game  
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