Certificateless signature scheme with security enhanced in the standard model |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, HungKuang University, 43302 Sha Lu, Taichung, Taiwan;2. Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering, National Chung Cheng University, 62102 Min-Hsiung, Chia-Yi, Taiwan;3. Department of Computer Science, RWTH Aachen University, 52056 Aachen, Germany;1. Department of Computer Engineering, Malayer Branch, Islamic Azad University, Malayer, Iran;2. United Institute of Informatics Problems, Surganova St. 6, 220012 Minsk, Belarus;3. Otto-von-Guericke-Universität, Fakultät für Mathematik, PSF 4120, 39016 Magdeburg, Germany |
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Abstract: | Certificateless cryptography is an attractive paradigm, which combines the advantages of identity-based cryptography (without certificate) and traditional public key cryptography (no escrow). Recently, to solve the drawbacks of the existing certificateless signature (CL-S) schemes without random oracles, Yu et al. proposed a new CL-S scheme, which possesses several merits including shorter system parameters and higher computational efficiency than the previous schemes. However, in this work, we will point out that their CL-S scheme is insecure against key replacement attack and malicious-but-passive KGC attack. We further propose an improved scheme that overcomes the security flaws without affecting the merits of the original scheme. We prove that our scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message attacks under the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption in the standard model. |
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Keywords: | Cryptography Certificateless signature Standard model Provably secure |
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