Fairness in secure computing protocols based on incentives |
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| Authors: | Yilei Wang Leisi Chen Ho-fung Leung Chengyu Hu Beijing Chen |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of Information Science and Electrical Engineering,Ludong University,Yantai,China;2.Shandong Provincial Key Laboratory of Software Engineering,Jinan,China;3.Department of Computer Science and Engineering,The Chinese University of Hong Kong,Hong Kong,China;4.School of Computer Science and Technology,Shandong University,Jinan,China;5.School of Computer and Software,Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Nanjing,China |
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| Abstract: | Cloud computing is based on utility and consumption of computer resources. To solve the security issues in cloud computing, secure computing protocols are often used. Recently, rational parties as a new kind of parties are proposed, who wish to maximize their utilities in secure computing protocols. The utility definitions in most previous rational secure computing protocols derive from prisoner’s dilemma game (PD game). In two-party rational computing protocols, parties decide to send their shares according to their utilities. Recently, we revisit the incentives for rational parties in secure computing protocols and give new utility definitions according to them. We find that the new utility definition is not similar to PD game any more. We discuss two-party and multi-party cases, respectively, and prove that parties have incentives to send their share to others. Furthermore, we also prove that parties can maximize their utilities in both cases. |
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