Differential fault analysis on Camellia |
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Authors: | Wei Li [Author Vitae] Dawu Gu [Author Vitae] [Author Vitae] Zhiqiang Liu [Author Vitae] [Author Vitae] |
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Affiliation: | a School of Computer Science and Technology, Donghua University, Shanghai 201620, China b Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200240, China |
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Abstract: | Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher published by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000. On the basis of the byte-oriented model and the differential analysis principle, we propose a differential fault attack on the Camellia algorithm. Mathematical analysis and simulating experiments show that our attack can recover its 128-bit, 192-bit or 256-bit secret key by introducing 30 faulty ciphertexts. Thus our result in this study describes that Camellia is vulnerable to differential fault analysis. This work provides a new reference to the fault analysis of other block ciphers. |
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Keywords: | Side channel attacks Differential fault analysis Block ciphers Camellia |
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