| 一种激励相容的发电权交易双边拍卖机制 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 王雅娟,王先甲. 一种激励相容的发电权交易双边拍卖机制[J]. 电力系统自动化, 2009, 33(22): 25-28 |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 王雅娟 王先甲 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 武汉大学系统工程研究所,湖北省武汉市,430072;武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北省武汉市,430072;武汉科技大学冶金工业过程系统科学湖北省重点实验室,湖北省武汉市,430081 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金资助项目(60574071) |
| |
| 摘 要： | 基于拍卖机制设计理论,针对多个发电权出让方及多个发电权受让方参与的发电权交易市场,提出了一种激励相容的双边拍卖机制.首先描述了发电权双边拍卖交易过程,然后建立了考虑交易成本损耗的数学模型,并在该模型的基础上提出了一种双边拍卖机制,该机制对所有风险规避的发电权出让方及发电权受让方是激励相容和个体理性的,且在该机制下整个系统是弱预算平衡的.算例分析表明所述机制富有效率.
|
| 关 键 词： | 发电权 双边拍卖 交易成本 激励相容 个体理性 弱预算平衡 效率 |
| 收稿时间： | 2009-03-31 |
| 修稿时间： | 2009-11-06 |
An Incentive Compatible Double Auction Mechanism of Generation Rights Trade |
| |
| WANG Yajuan,WANG Xianji. An Incentive Compatible Double Auction Mechanism of Generation Rights Trade[J]. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2009, 33(22): 25-28 |
| |
| Authors: | WANG Yajuan WANG Xianji |
| |
| Affiliation: | WANG Yajuan1,WANG Xianjia1,2 (1. Wuhan University,Wuhan 430072,China,2. Hubei Province Key Laboratory of Systems Science in Metallurgical Process,Wuhan University of Science , Technology,Wuhan 430081,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | Using mechanism design theory,an incentive compatible double auction mechanism that admits multiple generation rights licensors and generation rights licensees is proposed. Firstly,a double auction process for generation rights trade is described. Secondly,a mathematical model considering various transaction costs is established,and a double auction mechanism based on it is presented. It is proved that the mechanism not only can satisfy incentive compatibility and individual rationality to all risk-averse g... |
| |
| Keywords: | generation rights double auction transaction costs incentive compatibility individual rationality weak budget-balance efficiency |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《电力系统自动化》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《电力系统自动化》下载全文 |
|
