| Abstract: | That psychologists are debating epistemological questions appears to be a relatively recent phenomenon only if one has no appreciation for the history of the discipline. Whether we evoke the writings of Wundt, Hull, Tolman, or more recent cognitive psychologists, it is impossible to escape the recurrence of certain fundamental questions on the nature of psychological knowledge and the justification of that knowledge. Even Skinner is a remarkably adept epistemologist despite his avowal that theories of learning are not necessary. But psychology has been enthralled for the better part of this century by a caricature of the very science it would become, and, while it has been consistently and severely criticized for this mistake, it has shown itself to be remarkably immune to such criticism. Part of the reluctance to change has stemmed from the lack of a serious indigenous alternative to the hackneyed version of logical empiricism and its operationist credo that have held sway over the discipline for the better part of its life. The papers included in the present issue of Canadian Psychology/Psychologie Canadienne are a small wedge into the broader conversation concerning what it means to have psychological knowledge. Each of these was part of a symposium presented at the Canadian Psychological Association Meetings in Montreal in 1988 by the Section on the History and Philosphy of Psychology. Each of the four papers argues (a) against the status quo of the shop-worn operationism and its attendant claims which pass for epistemology in psychology, and (b) for a renewed emphasis of either some one form of realism or constructionism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved) |
